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Constitutional Afterlife: 
The Continuing Impact of Thailand’s Post-Political Constitution 
 
Tom Ginsburg∗ 
 
 
Forthcoming, International Journal of Constitutional Law, January 2009 
 
Thailand’s constitution of 1997 introduced profound changes into the 
country’s governance, creating a “postpolitical” democratic structure in 
which an intricate array of guardian institutions served to limit the role of 
elected politicians. Ultimately, the constitutional structure was 
undermined in a military coup against populist billionaire Thaksin 
Shinawatra, who had taken over many of the institutions designed to 
constrain political power. Nonetheless, the 1997 constitution appears to 
be having a significant afterlife, in that its institutional innovations have 
survived the enactment of a new Constitution and continue to constrain 
the political process. This article describes the Thai situation and 
speculates on the conditions for constitutional afterlife. 
 
On September 19, 2006, General Sondhi Boonyaratkalin of the Thai military led a 
bloodless coup while the country’s controversial prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, 
was in New York, participating in the annual opening debate of the United Nations 
General Assembly. The next day, the self-proclaimed National Administrative Reform 
Council abolished the 1997 constitution. Thus ended an experiment in constitutional 
design that had been devised to overcome Thailand’s chronic problems of political 
corruption and instability, and had been heralded as an innovation in Asian 
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assistance on this article and Jacob Ricks for helpful comments. Thanks also to Andrew Harding, Peter 
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constitutionalism more generally. As Thailand’s political crisis continues under its new 
2007 Constitution, this article considers the impact of the 1997 document and argues that, 
notwithstanding its premature death, the document is likely to continue to exert 
significant influence in Thai politics.  
The Thai constitution of 1997 (B.E. 2540) exemplified a recent trend in 
constitutional drafting that is best characterized as post-political. The post-political 
constitution involves enhanced efforts to structure and channel democratic power and to 
limit the role of partisanship, encompassing not only constitutional courts but myriad 
other institutions that effect a highly refined separation of powers.1 Thailand’s 1997 
document featured a complex set of “guardian” institutional safeguards against legislative 
overreaching, constructed in nested institutions of mutual checks and balances. Not only 
did the constitution establish an array of independent oversight institutions, each with an 
intricate appointment mechanism, but it also included a nonpartisan elected body, the 
Senate, which played a central role in appointing the oversight institutions and was 
thought to guarantee insulation from the allegedly corrupting influence of political 
parties.  
This elaborately structured edifice of constraints on politics was, in the end, 
unable to withstand the political influences of Thaksin’s billionaire populism. Post-
political constitutions, the Thai example suggests, are hardly capable of restraining 
politics but, nonetheless, may transform it in novel ways. Indeed, one might speculate 
that post-political constitutions risk politicizing institutions with technocratic bases of 
legitimacy, overloading them with tasks they are not designed or prepared to handle. In 
                                                 
1 See FRANK VIBERT, THE RISE OF THE UNELECTED: DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW SEPARATION OF POWERS 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2007); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 
(2000). 
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the case of Thailand, the guardian institutions became vulnerable to hidden influence 
from the prime minister, who was willing to use an array of tools to perpetuate his power. 
This triggered forces that killed the 1997 constitution at the age of nine. 
But the formal death of the constitution did not terminate the various independent 
guardian agencies that it established. Most of these remained functional during the entire 
period of the coup and interim constitution, notwithstanding the lack of a formal legal 
basis for their authority, and were thus well-positioned to help usher in the current 
Constitution, with its slightly restructured but still heavily technocratic arrangements, 
which was adopted by referendum in August 2007. This suggests the notion of the 
constitutional afterlife, the impact of a text beyond the formal survival of a constitution 
as a legally binding document. 
Constitutional afterlife provides a novel way of thinking about constitutional 
impact. Traditionally, we think about the impact of constitutions in terms of the efficacy 
of their formal provisions. We imagine that constitutions matter when there is congruence 
between text and practice, and do not matter when such congruence is lacking. We might 
ask, for example, whether rights promised in the text are actually observed in fact, or 
whether institutions set up by a constitution operate within its constraints.2 Another 
criterion for success or failure might be endurance of the formal text, or the ability of a 
constitutional regime to deliver political goods such as economic growth and democratic 
stability.3 The Thai example suggests that constitutions might also matter for their 
enduring institutional innovations. Constitutional afterlife may be particularly important 
                                                 
2 Linda Camp Keith, Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1976-1996): Are They More 
than Mere 'Window Dressing?" 55 POL. RES. Q. 111 (2002). 
3 Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, The Lifespan of Written Constitutions (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with authors). 
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for the study of constitutionalism in unstable political environments.4 While modern Thai 
history does not bode well for the long-term survival of the current constitutional 
document, institutional endurance alone marks a significant step toward stability, and the 
legacy of 1997 may continue to make a difference for Thai governance. 
 
1. Thailand’s Constitutional Graveyard 
1.1. History 
The Kingdom of Siam was an absolute monarchy until 1932, when a group of young 
army officers led a bloodless coup d’état and established a constitutional monarchy. 
Those behind the new system were not republicans: they undertook their revolution while 
addressing the king as subjects and insisting that he had the final decision on whether to 
allow the establishment of constitutional government.5 The political forces behind the 
coup included both right-wing elements in the military and bureaucracy, and left-wing 
nationalists clustered around the intellectual Pridi Banomyong. The tension between the 
two (and with a third group, royalists who eventually aligned with the military in 1957) 
has arguably dominated Thai politics, in one form or another, for seven decades.  
Pridi was an anticolonial nationalist, of the same generation and orientation as 
Aung San, Nehru, and Ho Chi Minh. Unlike those figures, however, he faced not a 
departing colonial power but a more complex domestic environment in which the very 
nature of the state was highly contested.6 Pridi was one of the major drafters of the 1932 
constitution, which promised direct elections once half the citizens had completed 
                                                 
4 See also GRETCHEN HELMKE, COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). 
5 PAUL HANDLEY, THE KING NEVER SMILES: A BIOGRAPHY OF THAILAND’S BHUMIBOL ADULYADEJ, 45 
(Yale Univ. Press 2006).  
6 PRIDI BANOMYONG, PRIDI BY PRIDI (Chris Baker & Pasuk Phongpaichit trans., Silkworm 2000). 
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primary education.7 But when his economic plan included elements of nationalization, he 
was labeled a communist, and successive coups by the military and royalists followed, 
until politics stabilized under antiroyalist General Plaek (Phibun) Phibunsongkhram. 
Phibun aligned with Japan during World War II, and changed the name of the country 
from Siam to Thailand.8 After the war, Pridi became the country’s first elected prime 
minister, but Phibun soon managed to regain power, exiling Pridi. Phibun was deposed in 
turn by another coup in 1957, in which royalist elements allied with the army under Field 
Marshal Sarit Thanarat. The following five decades witnessed an oscillation between 
military rule and civilian government, accompanied by frequent constitutional change. 
In seventy-six years since the establishment of the constitutional monarchy, 
Thailand has had eighteen constitutions, somewhere between seventeen and twenty-three 
coups and coup attempts, and fifty-six governments.9 The pattern of constitution-making 
seems to have involved cycling among a relatively small number of institutional variants. 
The 1932 constitution, for example, was the basis for the 1952 document, just as the 1997 
constitution was the basis for the 2007 document. One of the chief axes of constitutional 
change has been whether the National Assembly, particularly the upper house or Senate, 
is to be elected or appointed by the government, military, or king. Because of their 
ephemeral quality, Thai constitutions do little to constrain those in power in accordance 
with the constitutionalist ideal. Still, the very fact that constitutions are repeatedly 
                                                 
7 CONST. SIAM (1932), art. 10. 
8 SULAK SIVARAKSA, SEEDS OF PEACE (Parallax1992). 
9 The dates of the country’s constitutions include 1932 (two documents were promulgated that year), 1946, 
1947 (interim), 1949, 1952 (revisions of the 1932 constitution), 1957, 1968, 1972 (temporary), 1974, 
1976, 1977, 1978, 1991 (two documents), 1997, 2006 (interim), and 2007. See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Thailand On coups, see 
http://www.harvardir.org/articles/1587/; http://australianetwork.com/news/infocus/s1745603.htm; and 
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2006/s1745732.htm. 
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promulgated suggests that they are playing some role in legitimating power-holders, and 
may reflect what one scholar describes as an “almost mystical faith that the promulgation 
of modern codes, statutes and constitutions would somehow produce a modern 
Thailand.”10 
 
1.2. The Unwritten Constitution 
As in every country, underlying the formal constitutional text of the day in Thailand is a 
set of informal norms and rules that constrains the exercise of political power.11 The 
unwritten constitution forms a daunting challenge for comparative research, as it lacks 
the clarity and definitiveness that we associate with legal rules, but is particularly helpful 
for understanding Thailand, where formal rules are unstable. Real constitutional 
constraint comes from unwritten constitutional norms, particularly those concerning the 
role of the country’s long-ruling and widely respected monarch, King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej, who took the throne after the still-unsolved murder of his brother in 1946.12  
The unwritten constitutional status of the king did not emerge automatically in 
1932, but was the result of decades of political battles between the monarchy, elected 
politicians, and the military. In 1956, for example, the king made a veiled criticism of the 
                                                 
10 David M. Engel, Law and Kingship in Thailand During the Reign of King Chulalongkorn, in 9 
MICHIGAN PAPERS ON SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA (Center for S. & Se. Asian Studies, Univ. Mich  
1975). 
11 See HERBERT W. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (Kennikat 1925); 
CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (G.P. Putnam 
1890); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L. J. 100 (2008), for 
treatments of the unwritten American Constitution. See also Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2007). 
12 See generally, HANDLEY supra note 5; Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Thailand: A Stable Semi-Democracy, 
in 3 DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ASIA 305 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., Lynne Riener 1989).  
 7 
 
military junta, provoking a strong reaction from Phibun that threatened royal autonomy.13 
Since Sarit’s coup in 1957, however, the palace has gradually expanded its authority, and 
the royally endorsed coup has become a standard feature of Thai politics. It was most 
apparent in 1981, when coup leaders moved against Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond (a 
former general) and took over much of Bangkok. The king’s refusal to grant the leaders 
an audience was crucial in undermining the coup, which collapsed after three days.14 
The king has developed ties with all the powerful groups in society, and the 
monarchy has established itself as the ultimate arbiter of political conflicts, sharing power 
with the politicians, bureaucrats, and generals who run the country on a day-to-day basis. 
The monarchy has remained a stabilizing factor, aloof from politics and yet intervening at 
crucial times to keep the system in some semblance of balance. This role has been played 
as a matter of informal politics rather than formal institutional authority. For example, the 
formal powers given to the king in the 1997 text were perhaps greater than what is 
accorded in comparable European constitutional monarchies, but not formidable.15 In 
reality, the king’s frequent though elliptical interventions in politics have meant that 
governance was bound by informal as well as formal constraints.16 At times, however, the 
monarch’s interventions have gone well beyond his limited formal role. For example, in 
1992, King Bhumibol appointed technocrat Anand Panyrachun as prime minister over 
                                                 
13 HANDLEY, supra note 5, at 134. 
14 Kobkua Suwannathat, The Monarchy and Constitutional Change Since 1972, in REFORMING THAI 
POLITICS 57 (Duncan McCargo, ed., Nordic Institute of Asian Studies 2002). 
15 These include refusing to assent to bills and calling for further deliberation (§ 94); dissolving the House 
of Representatives (§ 116) and convoked extraordinary sessions of the national assembly. 
16 KOBKUA SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, KINGS, COUNTRY AND CONSTITUTIONS: THAILAND’S POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 1932-2000 (Routledge Curzon 2003). 
 8 
 
elected MP Somboon Rahong, who had been nominated by the parliament. The choice 
was widely accepted, despite its utter lack of constitutional basis.17 
An incomplete listing of the unwritten constitutional rules is as follows: the 
monarch, head of state, is highly respected and will limit his interventions in the political 
sphere.18 However, on the occasions when he exercises his power, he will be respected. 
The military can step in to resolve perceived crises, and coups are a perfectly acceptable 
method of leadership change. However, coup-makers should always seek a private 
blessing from the throne before, and a public one immediately after, any coup.19 
Meanwhile, violence against the people is rarely, if ever, legitimate,20 and no political 
force is entitled to excessively restrict the freedoms of the people. Furthermore, there 
seems to be a constitutional understanding now that coup leaders should restore 
democracy by promising new elections and a new constitution. The coup leaders 
invariably promulgate a new interim text—the fact that Thailand has had so many 
constitutions attests to the tradition of blessing coups in this fashion. As one commentator 
has observed, Thailand has accepted constitutional processes without accepting 
constitutional ideals and practices, repeatedly adopting new texts that fail to endure or 
constrain.21 
                                                 
17 Kobkua Suwannathat, The Monarchy and Constitutional Change since 1972, in REFORMING THAI 
POLITICS, supra note 14, at 57, 61, 65. 
18 James Ockey, Monarch, Monarchy, Succession, and Stability in Thailand, 46 ASIA PAC. VIEWPOINT 115 
(2005) (monarch has institutionalized his influence to a great degree). 
19 Even the antiroyalist Phibun Phibunsongkram sought the king’s formal approval. HANDLEY, supra note 
5, at 91. In 1977, the Kriengsak coup did not seek go-ahead approval in advance, and was not received 
warmly by the king. Id. at 267–268. 
20 HANDLEY, supra note 5, at 267 (“Coups by this time were accepted among large parts of the Thai elite as 
a natural political change, especially if they were not violent.”). Bhumibol criticized the coup makers and 
the protesters in 1973, 1976 and 1992.  
21 Kanok Wongtrangan, Executive Power and Constitutionalism in Thailand, in CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASEAN COUNTRIES 287, 289 (Carmelo V. Sison ed., Academy of ASEAN Law and 
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The unwritten constraints, however, ensure that Thai authoritarianism is, in 
relative terms, not very authoritarian.22 Compared with neighboring Myanmar or 
Indonesia, repression by the Thai military has been relatively mild, even in its darkest 
hours. One can conclude that, though proceeding from a different historical tradition from 
Western liberal constitutionalism, Thai society operates on the basis of 
quasiconstitutional understandings of limitation on government that do not proceed from 
a written text. 
The monarch does not view constitutions as enduring or permanent institutions 
that constrain and channel power; in fact, he has spoken of constitutions as foreign 
imports, based on textbook notions of democracy that are not appropriate for Thailand’s 
unique political culture.23 Drawing on the Buddhist idea of impermanence, the king has 
emphasized that unworkable institutions can easily be changed and that constitutions are 
impermanent human creations.24 Thailand’s constitutional monarchy thus differs 
significantly from that of the United Kingdom or the Netherlands. There, constitutional 
monarchy suggests that both constitution and monarch are enduring, and that the former 
constrains the latter. The monarch is the embodiment of the nation, but not a force in 
politics. In Thailand, the monarchy is permanent, while constitutions are ephemeral. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Jurisprudence, Univ. Phillipines 1990), discussed in Ted L. McDorman, The 1991 Constitution of 
Thailand, 3 PAC. RIM L. & POL. J., 257, 263 (1995). 
22 See McDorman, supra note 21, at 218; Samudavanija, supra note 12; see also Ted L. McDorman & 
Margot Young, Constitutional Structures and Human Rights in Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Thailand and Vietnam, 47 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L. J. 85 (1998). 
23 In a 1992 speech, he mischaracterized the United States as providing a constitutional right to welfare, 
which he argued would not be fiscally sound if imported to Thailand. HANDLEY, supra note 5, at 344.  
24 HANDLEY, supra note 5, at 434; see also Andrew Harding, Buddhism, Human Rights and Constitutional 
Reform in Thailand 1 ASIAN J. COMP. L. (2007), available at http://works.bepress.com/andrew_harding/1. 
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Constitutions may not regulate the monarchy; nonetheless, they are used to legitimate 
temporal power-holders.25 
This constitutional scheme is workable in large part because the state is 
autonomous and continues to function without much interference from the political 
classes. Thailand has been influentially, if elliptically, described as a “bureaucratic 
polity,” to emphasize the relative autonomy of the state and the idea that political 
organization tends to occur in pervasive patron-client relations with state elites.26 The 
political parties are viewed as almost parasitic on the society, using money to organize 
their constituents rather than representing organic interests from the bottom up. There has 
been limited local involvement in decision-making, as governors are appointed Ministry 
of Interior bureaucrats. In short, Thailand’s stabilizing institutions—monarchy, 
bureaucracy, and Buddhism—all derive their power from extraconstitutional sources and 
are constrained by a set of informal norms rather than by formal rules. 
 One increasingly salient question is whether the unwritten constitutional rules 
with the traditional monarch at the center are institutional in character or uniquely tied up 
with the charismatic authority of Bhumibol Adulyadej.27 This issue is crucial, particularly 
as a monarchical succession looms. The crown prince is widely believed to lack the 
gravitas of his father, and so it is unclear whether he can use his power with sufficient 
prudence so as to preserve it. While the issue is beyond the scope of this paper, 
succession will provide a crucial test for the unwritten constitution.28 
 
                                                 
25 Samudavanija, supra note 12. 
26 FRED RIGGS, THAILAND: MODERNIZATION OF A BUREAUCRATIC POLITY (1966). 
27 SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, supra note 16, at 2, 20, 76. 
28 HANDLEY, supra note 5 at 363; but see Ockey, supra note 18 (greater institutionalization). 
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2. The 1997 Constitution 
The Thai constitution of 1997 was a watershed in Thai politics, marking the first time that 
a constitution was adopted with widespread public involvement.29 In 1991, one of the 
country’s many coups had been triggered by intramilitary factional politics.30 Once in 
power, the new leaders began to engineer constitutional reform to maintain power, and a 
military man, General Suchinda, was elected as premier. Political parties protested, and 
large demonstrations developed on the streets of Bangkok in May of 1992, demanding 
broader constitutional reform and a return to democracy. These protests were met with 
violence by the military. The crisis was averted only when the king remonstrated with the 
military prime minister and the leader of civilian protests on television.  
There followed an interim government of technocrats with some military 
representation, charged with overseeing the eventual return to democracy. Initially, the 
government sought to effectuate the transition through a constitutional amendment 
process, but ultimately it was decided that an entirely new draft was needed.31 A drafting 
commission, which included some elected members as well as appointed members, 
produced proposals in 1995, but these were resisted by entrenched elements of the Thai 
                                                 
29 For general accounts, see Peter Leyland, The 2007 Constitution and the Continuing Quest For Good 
Governance In Thailand (2001) (draft on file with author); Andrew Harding, May There Be Virtue: ‘New 
Asian Constitutionalism’ in Thailand, 3 ASIAN L. 236, 241 (2001); Michael Connors, Framing the 
‘People’s Constitution’, in REFORMING THAI POLITICS, supra note 14, at 37 (critiquing NGOs but 
essentially optimistic analysis); Duncan McCargo, Introduction, in REFORMING THAI POLITICS, supra 
note 14; see also Sombat Chantornvong, The 1997 Constitution and the Politics of Electoral Reform, in 
REFORMING THAI POLITICS, supra note 14, at  203. 
30 The coup followed rare public criticism of Western-style institutions by the king. HANDLEY, supra note 
5, at 337–339; see generally Ted L. McDorman, Constitutional Change and Continuity in Thailand in the 
Aftermath of the 1991 Coup, in ASIA-PACIFIC LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 218 (Douglas A. Johnson & Gerry 
Ferguson, eds., Univ. British Columbia Press 1998). 
31 Duncan McCargo, A Hollow Crown, 43 NEW LEFT REV. 135 (2007) (tying the need for a new draft to the 
desire to avoid political violence after the death of the current monarch, a sensitive assertion that was not 
reported in the local media). 
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scene.32 The drafting commission consisted of widely respected academics, as well as 
lawyers and other technocrats, but it had the support of the military.33  
Despite the king’s call for a short, simple constitution,34 the final draft was 
formidable: 336 articles and 142 pages in English translation.35 The process was designed 
as a model of public involvement and deliberation, with extensive consultations and 
education sessions. The adoption process, too, included the public as a backup option: the 
constitution was to be adopted by the National Assembly, but if the assembly rejected the 
draft, it would be put to public referendum, for the first time in Thai history. Huge public 
discussions with t-shirts (green for supporting the constitution, yellow for opposition) 
engendered public debate and discussion. In the end, the referendum was unnecessary, as 
the National Assembly adopted the text amid great public support. 
Many of the provisions of the 1997 document, such as the extensive list of rights, 
were fairly standard. The real innovations were institutional and were characterized by 
some as revolutionary in character.36 Designed to develop good governance and to 
resolve Thailand’s longstanding political problems, the document cabins and regulates 
the political process extensively.37 The main democratically elected body was the House 
                                                 
32 Peter Leyland, Thailand’s Constitutional Watchdogs: Dobermans, Bloodhounds or Lapdogs?, 2 J. COMP. 
L. 151 (2008). 
33 Harding, supra note 24, at 239; see also Andrew Harding, Southeast Asia, 1997–2003: Two Case Studies 
on the Politics of Law and Development, in GLOBALISATION AND RESISTANCE: LAW REFORM IN ASIA 
SINCE THE CRISIS (Christoph Antons & Volkmer Gessner eds., Hart 2007). 
34 HANDLEY, supra note 5, at 434.  
35 After the constitution’s demise, former coup leader Suchinda Krapayoon argued that the constitution was 
too detailed. Thailand’s Struggle for Constitutional Survival, Matichon, Mar. 12, 2007, quoted in 6 
ARTICLE 2, at 2 (2007), at http://www.article2.org/mainfile.php/0603/279. 
36 Paul Chambers, Good Governance, Political Stability and Constitutionalism in Thailand 2002 16 
(Occasional Paper, King Prajadhipok’s Institute, Aug. 10, 2002).  
37 My characterization of the motives as being good governance perhaps underemphasizes the specific 
political interests at stake. Michael Connors, Political Reform and the State in Thailand, 29 J. CONTEMP. 
ASIA 201 (1999). 
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of Representatives, selected using a mixed electoral system combining proportional 
representation and a set of district-based constituencies using a first-past-the-post 
system.38 House members were required to belong to political parties, and the 
constitution provided that expulsion from a party required giving up one’s seat.39 This 
innovation was designed to give party leaders control over their members and to 
encourage party discipline. It also was designed to overcome chronic problems of party-
switching that had prevented the emergence of stable parties, as candidates would move 
around depending on which party made the best offer.40  
Besides the House, the legislature included an elected Senate, composed 
exclusively of nonparty actors: anyone who had been a member of a political party for 
the past twelve months was ineligible. Here we can see clearly the “post-political” quality 
of the constitution: there was an assumption that parties were corruptive and that 
nonparty members were somehow insulated from external pressures. Senators were 
elected in single-vote, multimember districts, ensuring the representation of 
nonmajoritarian interests. Candidates for Senate were restricted from campaigning41 and 
could not run for reelection. The thought was that the Senate would attract local 
personalities who already had grassroots support, and hence were unlikely to be 
corrupted by the process of formal campaigning. 
                                                 
38 CONST. OF THE KINGDOM OF THAIL. (1997) §§ 98, 99, 102 [hereinafter 1997 CONST.]. 
39 Id. § 118. The constitution also contained some paternalistic elements. MPs were required to have a 
bachelor’s degree, an undemocratic requirement that Harding believes was nevertheless widely 
supported. Andrew Harding, May There Be Virtue: ‘New Asian Constitutionalism’ in Thailand, 3 ASIAN 
L. 236, 241 (2001). One effect of this restriction was to strengthen urbanites relative to traditional bosses 
in the countryside. 
40 One politician I spoke with recalled being asked to give a substantial amount of money to the party for a 
seat on the party list. Presumably the rule preventing party-switching strengthened party bosses relative to 
candidates, and would increase the price paid to parties, as opposed to parties paying candidates to join 
them. 
41 1997 CONST. § 129. 
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As constituted, the Senate did not fully achieve the goal of a disinterested, 
nonpartisan check on party politics in the House. One new phenomenon was that of the 
“husband and wife” constituency, in which relatives of prominent politicians would run 
in the same geographic areas for the “nonpartisan” Senate. Although the effort to 
introduce technocratic and grassroots candidates to balance professional politicians was 
unsuccessful, it did have some resonance in the Thai context. The nonpartisan Senate is 
best understood as trying to steer a narrow course between the Scylla of military 
intervention and the Charybdis of corrupt civilian politicians. In many previous 
constitutions, the Senate had served as an appointed body to check an elected 
legislature.42 In 1992, the Senate was designed to remain unelected so as to ensure a 
military veto. The Senate can thus be seen as a guardian institution, rather than a channel 
of democratic representation, much as the early U.S. Senate was seen as an elitist 
repository of wisdom and defender of national interests against popular passions.43 The 
1997 document marked a break by ensuring that it was constituted by the people rather 
than appointed by the military, king, or government, and it did so in a way that made 
sense in the context of local distrust of politicians and political parties.  
The 2007 Constitution combined public election with elite selection of senators..44 
As in the 1997 Constitution,  Senators must, again, be 40 years old and hold a bachelor’s 
degree.45 In addition, the elite selection committees—consisting of the presidents of 
many of the guardian institutions and judges nominated by the Supreme and 
                                                 
42 E.g., HANDLEY, supra note 5, at 342; 1978 CONST. OF THAIL. 
43 JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS (Vintage 1996). 
44 THAIL. CONST. 2007 §§ 111-113 [hereinafter 2007 CONST.] 
45 Id. at § 115; cf. 1997 CONST., § 125. 
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Administrative Courts—will take into account nominations from academia and civil 
society organizations.46 
The nominally apolitical Senate was a linchpin institution in 1997, because of its 
central role in appointing the various guardian institutions. The constitution included a 
plethora of these: the Election Commission, Audit Commission, Human Rights 
Commission, Ombudsman, Supreme Court (which included a special Criminal Division 
for Persons Holding Political Office), Supreme Administrative Court, Constitutional 
Court, and National Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC).47 These were constituted 
in a complex set of nested selection committees defined in the constitution itself. For 
example, the NCCC was nominated by a fifteen-member selection committee, including 
the presidents of the Supreme, Constitutional, and Supreme Administrative courts, which 
submitted a list of names to be selected by the Senate.48 The Election Commission was 
chosen by a special ten-member selection committee that included the presidents of the 
Constitutional and Supreme Administrative Courts, four rectors of universities elected by 
their fellow rectors, and four representatives of political parties that held seats in the 
House.49 The 2007 document retains all of these bodies but simplifies the selection 
committee structure. Instead of a specially constituted committee for each institution, 
nominations are now chosen by a core group consisting of the presidents of the Supreme, 
Supreme Administrative, and Constitutional Courts, along with the leader of the majority 
                                                 
46 2007 CONST., §§ 114. Interestingly, the Senate itself is involved in approving members of the guardian 
committees. See, e.g., id. at §§ 206, 229, 242. Thus, there is a degree of circularity in the appointment 
processes. 
47 In addition, the Anti-Money-Laundering Office was established by statute in 1999. 
48 1997 CONST. § 297. 
49 Id. at § 138. The selections required a 3/4 majority, giving groups of politicians and academics the power 
to veto nominations.  
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and the opposition leader of the House of Representatives.50 The courts thus become the 
guardians of the guardian institutions. 
The Election Commission is tasked with supervising election campaigns and 
executing electoral law. In 1997, it was a four-member body appointed by the Senate; the 
2007 version had four members plus a chairman. The Election Commission powers are 
extensive: it can annul election results, order new elections, and investigate fraud 
allegations. It used these powers extensively during Senate elections in 2000 and 2001, as 
well as in general elections in 2001, and, crucially, in 2005 and 2006 in the events 
leading up to the military coup.51 
Another guardian institution constitutionalized in 1997 was the National Counter-
Corruption Commission. Corruption has been endemic in Thailand, and the 1997 
constitution sought to address this. The NCCC collects reports on assets from politicians 
and senior bureaucrats to ensure that there are no mysterious increases during the time 
they are in public service. Those who fail to report assets can be barred from office, 
subject to approval by the new Constitutional Court.  
Appointments to the NCCC in both 1997 and 2007 were similarly structured to 
those on the Election Commission, with senatorial voting on candidates put forward by a 
selection committee. In 1997, this selection committee itself included members of various 
institutions and civil society, while the 2007 version is composed of the heads of the three 
highest courts and two leaders of the House of Representatives.52 The NCCC members 
                                                 
 
51 In the 2000 Senate elections, seventy-eight candidates were disqualified. 
52 Id. at § 246. 
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now serve for nine-year, nonrenewable terms (up from six) and may not hold other 
positions.  
Under the 1997 constitution, the Constitutional Court had a central role in policing 
the other independent bodies.53 In addition to interpreting the constitution and resolving 
jurisdictional disputes among governmental authorities, the Constitutional Court 
exercised an array of ancillary powers. It could confirm findings of and evaluate 
disclosures submitted to the NCCC, review whether any appropriations bill would lead to 
involvement of an elected official in the expenditure of funds,54 determine whether an 
emergency decree was warranted by a true emergency,55 determine whether election 
commissioners should be disqualified,56 and decide whether political party regulations 
violate the constitution or fundamental principles of Thai governance.57 Because of the 
overarching concern with corruption that animated the 1997 constitution, the Court had 
the power to demand documents or evidence to carry out its duties. In this sense, it was a 
kind of inquisitorial Constitutional Court. It was the exercise of these powers that 
embroiled the Court in controversy during the political crisis of 2006 discussed below, 
                                                 
53 The court was composed of a president and fourteen judges appointed by the king on the advice of the 
Senate. It included five justices of the Supreme Court, two from the Supreme Administrative Court, five 
other lawyers, and three persons with political science degrees. Nominations for the latter two categories 
came from the selection committee, which included four deans of law and four of political science 
faculties, four MPs and the president of the Supreme Court. This committee nominated ten persons with 
law degrees and six with political science degrees; the Senate then elected five law degree holders and 
three political science degree holderse  from this list to serve on the Court. 1997 CONST. § 255-257. 
54 1997 CONST. § 180. 
55 Id. at § 219. 
56 Id. at § 142, referring to §§ 137 and 139. 
57 Id. at § 47, para. 3. 
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and, unsurprisingly, the 2007 document scales back the Court’s ancillary powers,58 
restoring it to a more conventional role. 
The creation in 1997 of a system of administrative courts to allow citizens to 
challenge government action was an enormous innovation.59 Although given less 
attention worldwide, the availability of judicial review of administrative action is in some 
sense more important than constitutional review, in that most citizens encounter the state 
in simple interactions that do not raise constitutional issues. This innovation was 
particularly important in Thailand, where the state had traditionally been insulated from 
public scrutiny.60 Analysts report that, even more than the Constitutional Court, the 
Administrative Court has played a major role in structuring citizen-state relations since 
1997 and is becoming an important arena.61 The court has issued a wide range of 
judgments constraining the government at many levels. For example, in a well-known 
case involving a government-chartered television station, ITV, Thaksin’s family was a 
majority stakeholder and sought to renegotiate the licensing arrangement, which had been 
issued by the prime minister’s office.62 Interestingly, the bureaucrats in the office 
resisted, and the court sided with them against a company controlled by the sitting prime 
minister himself. In another case in 2008, the court enjoined the foreign minister from 
                                                 
58 For a prediction to this effect, see Tom Ginsburg, Ancillary Powers of Constitutional Courts, in 
INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAW: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES (Tom Ginsburg & Robert Kagan eds., Peter 
Lang Publishing, 2004). 
59 1997 CONST., §§ 276–279. 
60 FRED RIGGS, THAILAND: THE MODERNIZATION OF A BUREAUCRATIC POLITY (Univ. Hawaii Press 1966). 
61 Leyland supra note 32. 
62 Peter Leyland, The Emergence of Administrative Justice under the 1997 Thai Constitution, in THE 
JUDICIALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA (Tom Ginsburg & Albert Chen eds., 
Routledge 2009). Leyland’s research provides numerous other examples of constraint by the 
administrative courts.  
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taking action that might support Cambodia’s bid for UN funding for a contested border 
temple. 
These institutions, established in 1997, are all in some sense post-political. They 
reflect the idea that democratic politics ought to be constrained and that the political 
process cannot be trusted to ensure clean politics. This reflects long-standing Madisonian 
themes in democratic theory, as filtered through the twentieth-century shift away from 
parliamentary sovereignty. The Thai constitution is an extreme case, however, in its 
efforts to insulate appointments and management of the “guardian institutions” from any 
taint of political parties. In addition to having complex selection committees, the 
apolitical Senate was a crucial veto gate for all the institutions. This no doubt reflects not 
so much progressivism on the part of the drafters of the 1997 text but, rather, Thailand’s 
long-standing ambivalence toward politics and politicians. Conservative forces have 
always viewed democracy with some trepidation, and Thailand’s constitutional history is 
replete with unelected legislative institutions appointed by elite bodies. The general 
global trend toward guardian institutions interacts with a set of local elite and 
technocratic values. 
  
3. The Life and Death of the 1997 Constitution 
After its adoption with widespread support, the 1997 constitution got off to an auspicious 
start, as the complex set of institutions it inaugurated began to regulate politics. The Thai 
Constitutional Court, for example, took up high-profile cases involving scrutiny of 
politicians. In one such case, Sanan Kachornprasart, the minister of interior and deputy 
prime minister, was found to have deliberately submitted a false statement of his assets to 
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the NCCC. In August 2000, the Constitutional Court unanimously confirmed the report 
of the NCCC, leading to a five-year ban from office for the prominent politician.63 By the 
end of 2000, the Court had confirmed NCCC decisions in 17 cases. 
 Things began to change with the election of January 2001, which brought to 
power Thaksin Shinawatra, who had built a fortune in the telecommunications business, 
and then entered politics in 1994, becoming an MP and cabinet member in the early years 
of return to democracy. Described as Thailand’s Silvio Berlusconi, Thaksin offered little 
in the way of substantive policy, but he tapped into regional resentments and built a 
following in the rural North and Northeast. Like his Italian counterpart, Thaksin has long 
been linked with corruption, and, in early 2001, when he was the leading candidate for 
prime minister, he was found to have registered his assets in the names of various 
household staff and business colleagues. When Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party 
subsequently won the elections, the Constitutional Court was placed in a difficult 
position; it was called on to confirm the NCCC decision, which would have banned 
Thaksin from politics for five years. In a divided decision that has been described as 
confused, the Court found that the false report had not been filed deliberately, and 
thereby allowed Thaksin to assume the office of prime minister. This result was reached 
by deciding two separate issues: first, that Thaksin was not required to file an asset report 
and second, that his false report had been inadvertent.64 The Court decided each issue 
against Thaksin but, in accordance with its odd voting rules, aggregated the pro-Thaksin 
                                                 
63 Constitutional Court Decision 31/2543 (2000) (Thailand). 
64 Andrew Harding, The Politics of Law and Development in Thailand, Seeking Rousseau, Finding Hobbes 
11–12 (presented at Conference on Law and Development at a Crossroads: Asian Alternatives to 
Universal Schemes, Feb. 9-10, 2008). 
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votes on the two issues against the affirmative votes in the first case, allowing the clear 
winner of the election to take power.  
Thus began a long chapter that ultimately led to the constitution’s demise. 
Thaksin subsequently consolidated his power, acquiring political parties by merger and 
acquisition, and securing Thailand’s first ever single-party majority government in 2001. 
Despite (or perhaps due to) a more active Election Commission, the price of vote-buying 
went up during this election. Yet the Election Commission disqualified only two 
candidates out of 312 against whom complaints were lodged. Gradually, Thaksin began 
to influence all the independent political institutions, including the Constitutional Court 
and those designed to prevent corruption. He did this through a combination of 
appointments, intimidation, and bribery, particularly focusing on the Senate, which 
played the linchpin role in appointments. Eventually, all the institutions succumbed to his 
pressure; among the people he appointed to the Election Commission, for example, was a 
general who had himself been disqualified by the commission.65 Those who were not 
cowed were not reappointed.  
To be fair, the oversight institutions were not completely pro-Thaksin. The 
Constitutional Court ruled that a couple of his appointments, including the Election 
Commission and the auditor general, had not followed proper procedure.66 The NCCC 
was celebrated by some as being particularly effective, but came under severe attack in 
2005, when it awarded itself a significant salary increase without parliamentary 
scrutiny.67 The Criminal Division of the Supreme Court ruled that the nine 
                                                 
65 Leyland, supra note 32, at 158. 
66 Id. at 159. 
67 Id. at 171. 
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commissioners violated the law, and removed them from office. New appointments were 
not forthcoming, so the commission became dormant. All in all, the general perception 
was that the independent agencies did not function as they should have. 
Thaksin’s first term was marked by the disappearance of up to 3,000 suspected 
drug dealers, as well as a confrontational attitude toward renewed Muslim insurrection in 
the South of the country. He also was accused by critics of overriding the constitution by 
declaring a state of emergency in the South. When the Human Rights Commission 
complained, the prime minister attacked it in the media, although he did modify the 
emergency decree.68 In January 2005, Thaksin won reelection when his party captured an 
overwhelming majority of parliamentary seats, making it impossible for the opposition to 
mount a vote of no confidence.  
Eventually, Thaksin’s heavy-handed tactics prompted domestic opposition, first 
from fellow elites such as media tycoon Sondhi Limthongkul, who eventually made 
claims that Thaksin sought to overthrow the monarchy.69 Only when Thaksin passed a 
series of laws that allowed him to sell his company, Shin Corporation, to a Singapore 
entity in early 2006 for $1.9 billion without paying taxes, however, did the middle class 
of Bangkok withdraw its support. Thaksin was sued for alleged corruption and electoral 
violations, and was charged with spending an estimated $260 million in bribes to voters 
in the campaign.70 Because the NCCC was not in operation, the case went before the 
Constitutional Court, which, true to its pro-Thaksin reputation, found that there was no 
justiciable case.  
                                                 
68 Id. at 172. 
69 Kevin Hewison, Constitutions, Regimes and Power in Thailand, 14 DEMOCRATIZATION 928, 937 (2007). 
70 Leyland, supra note 32, at 168. 
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With no help from any political institutions, anti-Thaksin members of the public 
began to demonstrate in the streets, calling for his resignation or impeachment, 
particularly in the wake of the sale of Shin Corporation. Thaksin then dissolved 
parliament and called a snap election for April 2, 2006, but the opposition chose to 
boycott it, saying Thaksin should step down first. The election went forward, but because 
of irregularities and the boycott, failed to produce a clear result.71 At this point, on April 
26, 2006, the king met with the leaders of the Constitutional, Supreme, and Supreme 
Administrative courts and publicly called for them to resolve the constitutional crisis, 
suggesting they should void the April election. The Constitutional Court responded by 
annulling the election; three election commissioners were jailed, on the grounds that the 
time allowed for the campaign had been too brief and that some polling booths had been 
positioned to allow others to view the ballots as they were cast. Five new election 
commissioners, who had just been chosen after months of deadlock, would be replaced. 
Nevertheless, with political institutions at a standstill, the appointment process could 
hardly operate effectively. The Constitutional Court seemed to have failed to resolve the 
problem completely. This is a paradigmatic example of the politicization of the judiciary 
that post-political constitutions risk by placing great power in the hands of guardians. 
Still, there seemed to be light at the end of the tunnel. A November election was 
expected to produce valid results at last.72 Then, however, Thaksin began to interfere with 
                                                 
71 Thaksin’s party won 80 percent of the seats, running unopposed in many districts. However, the election 
law required that any candidate running unopposed garner at least 20 percent of the vote in a district in 
order to win the seat. James Ockey, Thailand in 2006, 47 ASIAN SURVEY 133, 134 (2007). As many 
voters left their ballots blank in protest, Thaksin’s candidates failed to capture the necessary 20 percent in 
thirty-eight districts (despite the TRT allegedly having provided support to small parties to ensure 
competition). This produced a constitutional crisis because the election had not produced a sufficient 
number of seats for the parliament to be seated. By-elections were required in the thirty-eight 
constituencies, but these, too, failed to produce a full slate of members of parliament. 
72 Old Soldiers, Old Habits, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 2006, at 27. 
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the military, promoting his own cohorts in the military hierarchy and replacing those 
associated with Privy Councilor Prem Tinsulanonda, a retired general and former prime 
minister. Public demonstrations intensified in the fall; as Thaksin prepared to hold new 
elections, the military stepped in. 
Thus the Thai constitution of 1997 died a peaceful death at the age of nine. The 
sources of its failure were not congenital but, rather, reflected the difficulty of designing 
any institutional solution to governance problems in a country as corrupt as Thailand, 
particularly with a billionaire prime minister willing to bribe any and all in his pursuit of 
power. However, Thaksin was only the precipitating cause. Deeper problems of political 
institutions remain, impervious to formal solutions. 
 
4. The Interim Constitution 
Speculation on motives for the 2006 coup abound. Some believe that it was designed to 
prevent an outbreak of violence that might have emerged during demonstrations and 
counterdemonstrations over Thaksin’s campaign the following weekend. Perhaps more 
plausibly, Thaksin’s attempt to promote his own classmates in the military command 
structure triggered a counter-reaction from another class of military commanders—
intermilitary factional disputes had been the basis for many a coup and failed coup 
previously. No doubt deeper tensions in civil-military relations, over the conflict in the 
South, also helped lay the groundwork for the coup.73 Rumors also allege that Thaksin’s 
wealth had found its way into the royal family itself, as he sought to corrupt certain 
members.  
                                                 
73 Ockney, supra note 74, at 137. 
 25 
 
The coup leaders followed a venerable tradition of blaming civilian corruption for 
the need to step in. They promptly appointed a government led by former army 
commander Surayud Chulanond. Crucially, the coup leaders kept alive most of the 
independent commissions, although the interim constitution does not so stipulate.74 The 
only major institutional reform is that the interim constitution takes judicial review from 
the Constitutional Court and sets up a Constitutional Committee, consisting of the chair 
of the Supreme Court and the chair of the Administrative Court, along with five justices 
of the Supreme Court elected by their colleagues.75 No doubt this reflects disappointment 
in the Constitutional Court that had allowed Thaksin to take power in the first place and 
later seemed to serve his interests. 
The interim constitution outlined a process for constitutional reform and promised 
wide public participation.76 It set up a Constitutional Drafting Assembly and a 100-
member nonpartisan Constitutional Drafting Commission to be selected by the coup 
leaders from a larger group.77 Actual drafting was done by a subcommittee of 35, 
consisting of 25 persons from the Drafting Commission along with 10 appointed by the 
coup leaders, chaired by Prasong Soonsiri, a veteran ally of Prem. The 1997 constitution 
was to be treated as a default, with the drafters required to explain any deviations from 
it.78 In this way, the coup leaders signaled their commitment to set politics aside, ensure 
some institutional continuity, and provide an anchor for the drafting process. There does 
not appear to be formal precedent in Thailand for this kind of constitutional anchoring, 
                                                 
74 2006 INTERIM CONST. OF THAIL. [hereinafter INTERIM CONST.]. Article 26 implies that the institutions 
will remain in place, since they will be consulted on the draft of the permanent Constitution, but the 
interim constitution nowhere states that they will remain operational. 
75 INTERIM CONST. art. 35. 
76 Id. at pmbl. 
77 Id. at art. 19. 
78 Id. at art. 26. 
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though research on drafting processes is limited, and we do not know what happens 
behind the closed doors of the drafting room. 
Drafting was followed by consultation with a wide range of institutions, 
presentation to the king, and a public referendum. Should the referendum have voted the 
Constitution down, the government and national assembly were to select a previous 
constitution to be used as the new constitution. Either way, elections were to be held 
within 45 days. In an interesting innovation, members of the Constitutional Drafting 
Assembly are not allowed to run for election for two years after completing their duties.79  
The coup leaders also took steps to punish Thaksin and ensure that he would not 
return to political life, extending the investigation that had begun under the 1997 
constitution. The Constitutional Tribunal under the interim constitution heard a trial for 
fraud and found the Thai Rak Thai party liable on corruption charges in May 2007, 
forcing it to disband and banning many of its leaders from office for five years. A 
separate process ordered the seizure of Thaksin's assets and issued arrest warrants for him 
and his wife, who eventually was convicted of tax fraud and sentenced to prison. At this 
writing, Thaksin and his wife are in exile in London. 
 
5. Constitutional Afterlife? The 2007 Constitution 
In April 2007, a provisional draft of the new Constitution was released, and in keeping 
the coup leaders’ timetable, was approved in August by a referendum, with a majority of 
58 percent. This marked the first ever referendum held on a constitution in Thailand; the 
1997 constitution had promoted the idea but not actually utilized it. The draft document 
                                                 
79 Id. at art. 30. This decision was also undertaken in drafting after the French Revolution in 1789. Jon 
Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364, 385 (1995). 
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largely followed the 1997 constitution, although it contained a number of controversial 
new provisions; public debate forced the drafters to scale back some of the latter.80 
Among other things, the 2007 Constitution reinstated the Constitutional Court and again 
gave it extensive ancillary powers, including policing political parties,81 removal from 
office of members of parliament and ministers,82 approval of disqualification of election 
commissioners,83 approval of organic laws for important institutions,84 approval of 
challenges to emergency decrees,85 and a role for its chairman in committees that select 
senators. The other watchdog institutions also were retained, with slightly streamlined 
appointment procedures.86  
One of the areas in which the 1997 text will have influence is criminal procedure. 
The 1997 document introduced many radical changes, including requiring judicially 
issued warrants for arrests;87 demanding speedy consideration of reasonable bail;88 
proclaiming the right to a speedy, continuous, and fair trial;89 guaranteeing the right to a 
                                                 
80 Section 68 of the draft constitution, subsequently withdrawn, extended the ancillary powers of 
constitutional courts quite far. While providing for a right of resistance against those who take power 
through unconstitutional means, the section allows for the formation of an emergency governing council 
of the prime minister, the chairpersons of upper and lower houses, the leader of the opposition, and the 
chairpersons of the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, Supreme Administrative Court, and 
independent organizations.  
81 Id. at § 65. 
82 Id. at §§ 91, 106, 182. 
83 Id. at § 233. 
84 Id. at §§ 138–141.  
85 Id. § 185. 
86 The 2007 Constitution also introduced a code of ethics for officeholders, for which compliance is to be 
monitored by the ombudsman and, in serious cases, the NCCC. Violators are subject to a strict ban from 
political office. It retained the rule preventing candidates from switching parties ninety days before an 
election, designed to prevent parties from buying candidates. It involves assets declarations for political 
officeholders and their families. Id. at §§ 279, 280, 250.. 
87 1997 CONST. § 237; see also 2007 CONST.§ 32. 
88 1997 CONST. § 239. 
89 Id. at § 241; see also 2007 CONST. § 40. 
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lawyer during interrogation;90 and establishing witness and victim protection.91 These 
provisions provoked a major revision to the country’s criminal procedure code and the 
passage of other laws to effect these changes.92 The expansive list of human rights, too, is 
retained in the 2007 document, with only minor reorganization and reformulation.93 
Other innovations concern the prime minister, who must be an elected member of 
the House and may not serve more than two four-year terms.94 Perhaps the major 
distinction between the 1997 and 2007 documents is that the latter reverts, in part, to an  
appointed Senate.95 The attraction of a paternalistically selected upper house as a check 
on “ordinary” electoral politics remains strong in Thailand, where politicians are 
distrusted but the military is considered unfit for long-term rule. The half-appointed 
current Senate will retain its status as an elite check on partisan politics; it remains to be 
seen whether it will perform any more admirably in this role than its elected 
predecessor.96 
These institutional revisions notwithstanding, the core institutional structures 
remain substantially the same. The 1997 constitution, though it died at the tender age of 
nine, will have lasting impact on Thai politics in the core area of restraints on 
                                                 
90 1997 CONST. § 241.   
91 Id. § 244–245; see also 2007 CONST. § 40(5). 
92 See Siriphon Kusonsinwut, Protecting Witnesses or Perverting Justice in Thailand? (June 2006) 
(unpublished JSD Thesis, University of Illinois College of Law). 
93 2007 CONST. §§ 26–69. 
94 Id. at § 171. 
95 One senator will be selected from each Changwat (province). With seventy-six Changwat (counting 
Bangkok) and 150 total senators, this means that roughly half of the Senate will be appointed by a 
committee composed of heads of the Constitutional Court, Election Commission, Ombudsmen, National 
Counter Corruption Commission, State Audit Commission, and one judge from each of the Supreme 
Court and Supreme Administrative Court as entrusted by the general meeting of the Supreme 
Administrative Court. 2007 CONST. §§ 111, 113, 114. Nominations may come from “academic 
institutions, public sector, private sector, professional organizations and other organizations.” Id. at § 108. 
96 The 2007 Constitution retains the requirement that senators have at least a bachelor’s degree, a 
controversial and elitist educational requirement. Id. at § 115. 
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government. In this sense, the 1997 constitution continues, in its afterlife, to constitute a 
critical juncture in Thailand’s long and tumultuous political history.97 Only time will tell 
if these seeds of constitutionalism are in fact rendered effective. 
In this regard, the choice of the coup leaders to allow some institutional continuity 
is a sound one. Successful written constitutions depend on an array of informal 
understandings, including the development of institutional reputations that can ensure 
effectiveness. Many of the post-political institutions of 1997 did contribute significantly 
to effective governance. The Administrative Court, for example, is a great success story, 
voted “independent institution of the year” in a public opinion poll.98 The Human Rights 
Commission  devised solutions for easing  tensions in southern Thailand—including the 
idea of an apology and greater autonomy—that laid the groundwork for the military 
government’s peace-building initiatives there. Institutional continuity will allow these 
bodies to build on past successes, and help to develop effective power in the future.  
Thus, the 1997 constitution promises to have a longer afterlife than its short life might 
lead one to believe.  
 
6. The Institutions Bite Back 
In December 2007, elections were held as initially promised by the coup leaders. 
Thaksin’s banned Thai Rak Thai party had regrouped under the banner of the People’s 
Power Party (PPP) and won a plurality, securing 233 of the 480 seats. Thus, the coup 
leaders’ worst nightmare materialized: the party associated with Thaksin had prevailed, 
                                                 
97 This notion of constitutional afterlife has some precedent in Thai history. The 1991 constitution, for 
example, was modeled on its 1978 predecessor, and 1932 has been a touchstone as well. See McDorman, 
supra note 30, at 224. 
98 Leyland, supra note 65. 
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and was able, eventually, to form a government headed by Samak Sundaravej, an old-
time politician hand-picked by Thaksin.99  Popular protests, supported by the disaffected 
middle class, ensued, along with counterdemonstrations in support of the government. 
These have continued throughout the summer of 2008, erupting in violence in September 
and October. 
While much of the conflict has played out in the streets, the balance of power 
between the pro- and anti-Thaksin forces is also being determined by the increasingly 
assertive independent agencies held over from the 1997 constitution. In particular, the 
Election Commission and the courts played a crucial role in policing the election, finding 
substantial irregularities in its conduct after receiving more than 940 complaints.100  
The Election Commission banned the designated speaker of the new parliament 
from politics for campaign irregularities. This raised the specter of the disbanding of the 
entire PPP, since Thai law allows parties to be disbanded by the Constitutional Court on 
recommendation of the Election Commission if a party officer is convicted (by the 
Supreme Court) of electoral wrongdoing that benefited the party.101 In early December, 
the Court ruled against the PPP, forcing its members to reorganize.102  
The courts were also the site of battles over Prime Minister Samak. Responding to 
a complaint submitted by the unelected Senate, the Constitutional Court ruled in 
                                                 
99 He subsequently showed some independence from Thaksin. Pasuk Phongpaichit & Chris Baker, Samak: 
The Fly in Thaksin’s Ointment, 171 FAR E. ECON. REV. 25 (2008). 
100 The Election Commission rules on complaints, either by certifying the election or handing out a “yellow 
card” or “red card” to the winner, disqualifying the candidate and leading to a by-election. A red card 
bans the candidate from office for a year, while a yellow card simply calls for a new election, in which 
the candidate in question can still compete. In the first few weeks after the election, the commission 
issued a number of yellow and red cards, mainly, though not exclusively, to PPP candidates. 
101 2007 CONST. § 237 
102 The Constitutional Court had already banned two other parties in the governing coalition—the Chart 
Thai and Matchimathipataya parties—for campaign violations. 
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September 2008 that Samak had violated Thai law by serving as the host of a television 
cooking program and had to resign the premiership. The PPP threatened to renominate 
him, but ultimately he was replaced by Somchai Wongsawat, Thaksin’s brother-in-law. 
Protests, however, continued, and Somchai was himself accused of constitutional 
violations that would disqualify him from office. As protests grew more violent, a state of 
emergency was called.  With the ruling against the PPP, Somchai would likely be banned 
from politics, resolving the immediate political crisis, but perpetuating uncertainty. 
Conclusion  
 The relatively short-lived 1997 constitution has wrought profound changes in the 
structure of Thai politics. Increasingly, the key players in Thailand are a handful of 
technocratic institutions whose role is to guard against the alleged excesses of partisan 
politics. It is well understood that the shift in constitutional power to unelected bodies 
poses challenges to conventional democratic theory.103 Unelected technocratic guardians 
are deciding who governs and how they can do so, and it is only a slight exaggeration to 
say that Thailand has been living with a continuous case of Bush v. Gore104 since 2001. 
The Thai case illustrates another consequence of the shift, namely that the technocratic 
institutions are themselves transformed by their new, high-profile mandates. The 
apparently post-political structure masks judicialized politics, and the guardians have 
inevitably been politicized as they are called on to determine who will govern. Many of 
the controversies will wind up in the courts, which will be called on to sort out the 
intricate institutional boundaries of the post-political Constitution. But the courts and 
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guardian institutions alone seem unable to ultimately resolve the ongoing political 
conflict in what has become a divided society.  
 One reason that the constitutional institutions have emerged in center stage is 
similar to that found in other accounts of judicialization.105 In a society divided among 
political forces of roughly equal weight, there is a functional demand for dispute 
resolution, particularly involving fiercely contested electoral politics. Thailand’s crisis 
pits a traditional elite and urban middle class against a populist, billionaire-led movement 
representing the country’s rural poor. Because the political conflict has endured over 
multiple constitutions, institutional continuity of the dispute resolution machinery has 
served the interests of all sides.  
In the context of Thailand, there is another element at play, which is the 
relationship between the new guardian institutions and the unwritten constitution. 
Thailand’s unwritten constitutional norms focus on the role of the monarch, whose 
effectiveness as mediator depends in large part on his reluctance to utilize his power. Few 
believe the monarchy is truly neutral in the present political conflict: indeed, the queen 
herself took the highly unusual step of presiding over the funeral of an antigovernment 
protester in October 2008, a move seen by some as sanctioning the demonstrations. But 
the monarchy as an institution depends for its legitimacy on its reluctance to descend to 
the political sphere too frequently. The monarch must remain the transcendent symbol of 
all Thais. The guardian institutions can reinforce this role by serving as the primary 
arenas of political conflict, performing a front-line role in resolving crises. It would not 
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(Keith Whittington, R. Daniel Keleman, & Gregory A. Caldeira eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2008). 
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be accurate to say that the guardian institutions are serving as the proxy of the throne—
they generally seem to decide the cases before them in a more or less neutral manner. But 
the impact of these guardian institutions is to check and limit electoral politics, and this is 
consistent with the traditional royalist view of politicians as self-interested. The guardians 
thus reinforce the unwritten constitutional norms surrounding the monarchy, preserving it 
as the ultimate guardian and relieving pressures that might otherwise threaten its position. 
The foregoing analysis suggests a generalizable hypothesis for the existence of 
constitutional afterlife. In environments of frequent constitutional turnover, unwritten 
rules may play an especially important role in stabilizing politics and providing order. 
But the innovations of written constitutions may also, sometimes, endure across iterations 
of formal enactment. The hypothesis is that such innovations will be effective and endure 
so long as they are consistent with and reinforce the unwritten constitution. Where 
innovations clash with the norms of the unwritten constitution, they will not find 
sufficient support to be retained across multiple written constitutions. This suggests that 
constitutions that initially appear ineffective and ephemeral can in fact have an impact 
beyond their own lifespan. They can create enduring institutions, but also reinforce 
unwritten norms that provide stability. 
 
Even after its demise in 2006, the structure wrought in 1997 has remained in 
place, enjoying a constitutional afterlife. The Thai example forces us to think about 
constitutional change as an iterative process. For most countries, constitutional reform is 
occurs periodically: the average person outside of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development countries will live under several constitutions in the course of 
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a lifetime.106 Understanding the effect of a particular set of constitutional provisions 
requires looking not only at their immediate implementation and efficacy, but also at 
institutional changes that they bring about, which may persist well into the future, and at 
their impact on unwritten constitutional norms. The true significance of a constitution 
may not be a matter of whom it empowers, or what formal restraints it provides, or even 
whether its provisions are implemented. Constitutions are moments of institutional 
innovation and recalibration, and set in motion processes that can endure beyond the 
formal texts, which are all too ephemeral. 
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